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ABSTRACT 
Physician Reimbursement, Time-Consistency and the Quality of Care 
by Robert Nuscheler* 
We use a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation to study physicians’ incentives 
to provide quality in the physician-patient relationship under price regulation. If the 
price is the only regulatory variable, the social planner cannot implement the first-best 
policy. Moreover, the second-best policy is time inconsistent. Excess entry and first-
best efficient total quality provision is observed in the game without commitment. 
Allowing physicians to compete in prices does not solve the commitment problem since 
the competitive solution coincides with the time consistent outcome. In the median 
voter equilibrium the time consistency problem is more severe.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Ärztevergütung, Zeitkonsistenz und die Qualität medizinischer Leistungen  
In einem Modell der horizontalen und vertikalen Produktdifferenzierung werden die 
ärztlichen Anreize, medizinische Qualität bereitzustellen, in Gegenwart von Preis-
regulierung untersucht. In Gegenwart zweier strategischer Variablen kann ein 
ausschließlich preisregulierender sozialer Planer das erstbeste Wohlfahrtsoptimum nicht 
implementieren. Darüber hinaus ist das zweitbeste Wohlfahrtsoptimum nicht 
zeitkonsistent. Mit zeitkonsistenter Regulierung ergibt sich eine effiziente Qualität 
medizinischer Leistungen, jedoch eine zu hohe Arztdichte. Preiswettbewerb zwischen 
den Ärzten führt zur selben Allokation wie bei zeitkonsistenter Regulierung. Die 
Probleme des Gesundheitsmarktes lassen sich somit nicht durch mehr Wettbewerb 
lösen. Das Zeitkonsistenzproblem ist noch gravierender, wenn über den Preis durch eine 
Mehrheitsabstimmung entschieden wird. Wendet man das Modell auf den deutschen 
Gesundheitsmarkt an, so zeigt sich, dass die kassenärztliche Zulassung – trotz 
Bedarfsplanung – zu großzügig ist. 
1 Introduction
In many countries the suppliers of health care services are compensated for medical treat-
ments according to a fee schedule chosen by some regulating authority. When there is no
possibility of competing in prices, suppliers of health care resort to other variables to in-
crease market share. Consider, for instance, competition between physicians. If a patient
needs medical assistance two major factors inﬂuence his decision for a private medical
practice (or private clinic): the quality provided by the physicians and the distance to
the medical practices. Hence, the physicians aiming at higher proﬁts will choose quality
levels and locations strategically.
There is a mutual dependency between location and quality decisions. Consider two
orthopedists A and B, both with an X-ray unit. Assuming that they are closely located,
quality competition will then be intensive. This can be interpreted in two ways: ﬁrst,
physician B, for example, may view these locations as a handicap, because they have to
compete in a small market. To increase his market share, B can improve his quality (e.g.
by buying a computer tomograph). Second, assume that B has the quality advantage de-
scribed above. Since A cannot react with price cuts to B’s advantage he will lose market
share. To avoid this, A will also buy a computer tomograph. To reduce quality compe-
tition, physicians will locate as far apart as possible. However, quality levels may still
remain high because of their deterrent eﬀect on other physicians and potential entrants.
The strategic importance of quality may lead to ineﬃciently high quality provision.
We study the incentives and consequences of price regulation in a 3-stage non-coopera-
tive game where the providers of health care have the following successive choices: entry,
location and quality. The players’ decisions are simultaneous at all stages. The sequential
structure reﬂects the diﬀerent degrees of irreversibility in the strategic decisions. Quality,
interpreted as medical machinery or eﬀort spent on treatments, is variable in the short
run. Quality choices are strategic given the locations. These cannot be changed in the
short run because of institutional barriers and high transaction costs of relocating. For
example, in Germany the licences are only valid for small districts. If a physician wants
to relocate he has to apply for a new licence. Finally, the entry decision is variable
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only in the long run because educational requirements are high. Alternatively, the model
may be interpreted as competition among private hospitals. Quality in terms of medical
machinery and size of the hospital rooms or beds per room are far more ﬂexible than
location.
The game is solved by backward induction leading to a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that the regulator is not able to implement the ﬁrst-best
eﬃcient allocation when price is the only regulatory variable. This is not very surprising
since it is in general not possible to achieve two goals (optimal quality level and optimal
number of clinics) when only one policy variable is available (price). We consider two ver-
sions of price regulation with and without commitment. If the regulator cannot commit
herself to a price, the set of possible prices is reduced to time consistent policies. The
symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium with price commitment is a second-best optimum
with excess capacity in both quality and entry. The second-best price turns out to be
not time consistent and thus cannot be an equilibrium in the game without commitment.
There is a unique time consistent price policy that leads to the ﬁrst-best level of total
quality provision, but also to excess entry. Since welfare is lower in the game without
commitment, the regulator would like to commit herself to the second-best price instead
of applying the time consistent (quality-optimal) price. Of course, this problem can be
solved by introducing a second regulation variable. The number of suppliers can be ﬁxed
by licences to the ﬁrst-best optimal level. But, from the increases in physician density
in all of the 15 EU member states from 1990 to 1999 (see EUROSTAT [2002, 68]), it
would appear that entry is not very much restricted. A “natural” suggestion for overcom-
ing the ineﬃciencies and the commitment problem is to allow physicians to compete in
quality and prices at stage 3 of the game. Like the social planner, the physicians trade oﬀ
the beneﬁts of quality against its costs and use the price to reduce quality competition.
Consequently, the (price-) competitive equilibrium coincides with the time consistent reg-
ulatory outcome. Introducing price competition has no eﬀect. If the regulator is to be
(re-)elected by patients the time consistency problem is more severe. Once physicians
have entered the market, patients care only about the net gain they derive from quality
provision, leading to lower welfare than in the time consistent regulatory equilibrium.
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Our model is related to the wide range of quality competition (or vertical diﬀer-
entiation) and spatial competition (or horizontal diﬀerentiation) literature, for exam-
ple, D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse [1979], Novshek [1980] and Salop
[1979] for horizontal diﬀerentiation, Gabszewicz and Thisse [1980] for vertical diﬀer-
entiation and Neven and Thisse [1990] for both. But, due to the peculiarities of most
of the health care systems, there is a major diﬀerence between these models and ours: the
absence of the price as a strategic variable. The idea of price regulation is found in Ma
and Burgess [1993]. They show, in a vertically diﬀerentiated setting, that the intro-
duction of price regulation reduces ineﬃciencies in quality. Since locations are exogenous,
their analysis stops where ours begins. The current paper is closely related to Econo-
mides [1993] and Gravelle [1999]. Both consider the same strategic variables and the
same sequential structure as those in the model presented here. In their models, location
choices have no eﬀect on quality provision thus precluding (non-price) competition in the
presence of price regulation. Furthermore, Gravelle [1999] assumes marginal costs to
be increasing in quality thereby introducing an adverse eﬀect of quality provision. In
contrast, we emphasize the public good property of the quality of medical care by consid-
ering zero marginal costs. Economides [1993] focuses on diﬀerent sequential structures
and their impact on equilibria. In contrast to the current paper, Economides [1993]
does not consider price regulation. As in our paper, Economides [1993] concentrates
on competitive equilibria where ﬁrms are direct competitors. Gravelle [1999] follows
Salop [1979] and also analyzes monopoly and kink equilibria. Our model builds on both
Economides [1993] and Gravelle [1999] in order to consider the important eﬀects of
location choice on quality choice, thereby capturing non-price competition in the health
care market. In addition, we explicitly consider, as these and the other papers mentioned
do not, problems of time consistency. With regard to Gravelle [1999], who applies a
similar model to the health care market, our paper contributes to the understanding of the
relationship between the second-best optimum, the time consistent regulatory outcome
and the equilibrium with price competition. Moreover, adding two more aspects to the
Gravelle [1999] analysis, we explicitly derive a number of ﬁrst-best eﬃcient regulatory
schemes and provide some empirical evidence.
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The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we introduce the model. The non-
cooperative equilibrium is determined in section 3 followed by the welfare analysis in
section 4. Regulation and time consistency is studied in section 5. Price competition is
introduced in section 6. In section 7 empirical evidence found in the German health care
system is presented. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a population of a city which is uniformly distributed on a circle with circum-
ference 1. Each inhabitant of this city has constant (inelastic) demand for one identical
medical treatment. Location of a patient on the circle is denoted by x ∈ [0, 1] and the
location of physician i by li ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, ..., n. The physicians are indexed such that
0 ≤ l1 ≤ l2 ≤ ... ≤ ln ≤ 1. A patient’s utility from one medical treatment by physician i
is
(1) u (x, qi, li, p) = qi − p− c (x− li)2 ,
where qi ≥ 0 is the quality of medical practice i. Quality is the medical equipment of
an institution and is assumed to be measurable and observable. Alternatively, quality
may be interpreted as an index capturing diﬀerent dimensions of quality. In the spirit
of Donabedian [1980, 79-85] these dimensions could be the structure, process, and
outcome of care. The regulated fee for the treatment is denoted by p and is identical
for all physicians. Notice that p may also be interpreted as the premium of a fair health
insurance with full coverage. Since we have assumed that the individuals have constant
demand for one medical treatment, a health insurance is redundant. The third term
measures transaction costs. These costs are quadratic in the arc-length distance from x
to li with c > 0.
1 The utility from not consulting a physician is assumed to be −∞. By
this assumption, physicians are never local monopolists, their neighbors will always be
1Both Economides [1993] and Gravelle [1999] consider linear transaction costs. In consequence,
marginal beneﬁts of an increase in quality are independent of locations. This precludes an important
issue of physician non-price competition.
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direct competitors. The monopoly and kink equilibria studied in detail by Salop [1979]
and Gravelle [1999] do not exist in the model presented here.2 For simplicity, we do
not allow physicians to compete with physicians who are not their neighbors. This is
without loss of generality, because a situation of competition between non-neighboring
physicians will never be an equilibrium in an entry game. In the language of Salop
[1979], there is always a competitive, but never a super-competitive, region.
The patient who is indiﬀerent between the two neighboring medical practices i and
i + 1 is called the critical patient, xcriti , and is implicitly given by u (x
crit
i , qi, li, p) =
u (xcriti , qi+1, li+1, p):
(2) xcriti =
qi − qi+1
2c (li+1 − li) +
li + li+1
2
.
Note that the critical patient is given by this equation if, and only if, physicians’ locations
do not coincide. It can be shown that identical locations cannot be an equilibrium in
pure strategies of the location subgame (see proof of Lemma 1 in the appendix). Given
the critical patients, the market share of physician i is Mi = x
crit
i − xcriti−1. The regulator’s
reimbursement policy is designed as a fee-for-service p ≥ 0 generating beneﬁts of pMi.
We assume symmetry of the physicians’ costs structures and that the cost function K (qi)
for the provision of quality qi is quadratic, K (qi) = kq
2
i , k > 0. Notice that these costs
are ﬁxed with respect to the number of treated patients. Without loss of generality, other
ﬁxed costs are assumed to be zero. Setting marginal costs to zero stresses the local public
good character of medical institutions.3 Physician’s i proﬁt function is then given by
(3) Πi = pMi − kq2i .
We do not address the problem of physician induced demand or quality elastic (total)
demand in this paper. Thus, the only incentive to provide high quality is an increase
2This seems reasonable when analyzing the health care market since, at least in the developed coun-
tries, everybody has access to medical care. This is in contrast to Gravelle [1999], where utility of
not consulting a physician is normalized to zero. Consider, for instance, inﬂuenza or appendicitis for the
hospital interpretation. In Gravelle’s model the “patient” may prefer to not take pharmaceuticals or not
have an appendectomy, i.e. he may prefer to die.
3Economides [1993] assumes the same for private goods. Of course this is equivalent to the assump-
tion of constant marginal costs MC > 0. Then p is the net-price: p = p˜−MC.
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in market share. Since quality levels are only due to quality competition, they can be
viewed as a lower bound for more realistic, but more complicated, elastic demand or
supplier induced demand models. Regarding equations (2) and (3), the physicians’ proﬁts
depend on their distance to their neighbors and their comparative quality advantages. We
assume the medical practices to be for-proﬁt institutions. Their objective is to maximize
proﬁts with respect to location and quality. This problem is analyzed in a three stage
non-cooperative game of complete information consisting of:
• Stage 1: On the basis of the expected (or announced) price pe ∈ [0,∞) the potential
entrants decide simultaneously whether to enter the industry, and n physicians
actually enter.
• Stage 2: The n physicians simultaneously choose their locations li ∈ [0, 1], i =
1, ..., n.
• Stage 3: The regulator chooses p ∈ [0,∞) and the n physicians decide simultane-
ously on their quality levels qi ∈ [0,∞), i = 1, ..., n.
Our decision for the sequential structure of the game is argued by the diﬀerences in
irreversibility of the strategic decisions. The entry decision is variable only in the long
run, because of demanding educational requirements. Institutional barriers and transac-
tion costs prevent locations being variable in the short run. Assuming that the medical
practices have plenty of capacity, quality, interpreted as medical machinery, is variable in
the short run. This also applies to the price set by the regulator. A theoretical, rather
than real life, reasoning for the sequential structure is as follows: if the physicians choose
quality and location simultaneously, then, by the same argument as in Gabszewicz and
Thisse [1992, 291-292], no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Novshek [1980]
solved this problem considering conjectural variations. With quality decision at stage
2 and location at stage 3, a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Since the
equilibrium quality provision is zero, quality competition cannot be studied in this setting.
Since the regulator’s price decision is at stage three and the entry decisions on the
basis of the expected price are at stage one, the question of the regulator’s ability to
commit herself is crucial for the outcome of the game. We consider two games, one
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in which the regulator can commit on p at stage 1 and a time consistent choice of p
without commitment. Before addressing the regulator’s price setting problem we have to
determine the non-cooperative outcome and the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient allocation of the game.
3 The non-cooperative equilibrium
3.1 Quality
We solve the game by backward induction leading to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
At the third stage of the game each physician maximizes his proﬁts with respect to quality,
taking quality levels of the others and all location choices as given yielding
(4) q∗i =
p
4ck
(
1
li+1 − li +
1
li − li−1
)
, i = 1, ..., n.
We do not observe reaction functions connecting the quality levels of the medical practices
directly.4 Since symmetry of the cost functions is common knowledge and locations are
observable, each physician is able to calculate his rivals’ equilibrium quality levels. Thus,
the direct quality reaction can be viewed as being hidden in the locations. Besides this
indirect reaction to others’ quality levels, physician i directly reacts with his quality
choice to the location choices of the neighboring practices. Locational disadvantages can
be reduced by providing high quality.5 In this sense, quality and location are aggressive
strategic variables. Minimum quality is chosen when physician i locates in the middle of
the practices i− 1 and i+ 1.6
The zero slope of the reaction functions hinges on the assumption of separability of
quality in the utility function. This is a standard assumption in these kinds of models to
4This result may be surprising at a ﬁrst sight. But it is theoretically appealing since the zero conjectural
variation assumption of the Nash equilibrium is consistent with the slope of the reaction functions (see
Bresnahan [1981]).
5Ma and Burgess [1993] found a similar strategic structure. In their model disadvantages in quality
can be reduced by price cuts one stage later.
6The impact of location choices on quality choices disappears when considering linear transaction costs
as in Economides [1993] and Gravelle [1999].
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keep the analysis tractable. As long as the transaction costs are convex, the quality level
depends on the own and on the neighbors’ locations. That quality increases in price is
fairly robust. When the utility function is given by f(q)− p− c(x− l)2 and the costs of
quality provision byK(q), then it is suﬃcient to assume the following plausible properties:
f ′ > 0, f ′′ ≤ 0, and K ′′ ≥ 0. More quality beneﬁts the patient but at a decreasing rate.7
Improving quality gets more expensive the higher quality is.
3.2 Location
To obtain the optimal location choices of the practices we have to study the relation
between quality levels and locations in more detail. We have to bear in mind that, besides
the own quality level, the optimal quality levels of the practices i−1 and i+1 also depend
on the location choice of physician i according to equation (4). From the respective ﬁrst
order conditions it is straightforward to derive the following reaction coeﬃcients
∂q∗i−1
∂li
= − p
4ck
1
(li − li−1)2
,(5)
∂q∗i
∂li
=
p
4ck
(
1
(li+1 − li)2
− 1
(li − li−1)2
)
,(6)
∂q∗i+1
∂li
=
p
4ck
1
(li+1 − li)2
.(7)
Consider the situation shown in ﬁgure 1. Suppose practice i decides to locate closer to
practice i+1 (dli > 0) starting from a symmetric situation. The competition in this market
area becomes more intensive. The intensity is further increased by the enhancement of
quality of practice i according to equation (6). Practice i captures some of the market
of practice i + 1. Since the location choices are simultaneous, and the optimization is
with respect to given locations of the others, there is no reaction in location of practice
i + 1. Physician’s i + 1 response to the approaching (and quality improving) practice
i is to increase his own practice’s quality in the extent of (7). Competition between
physicians i and i − 1 is weakened because of the increased distance. Practice i − 1 can
lower its quality following (5) without losing much of the market, if any at all. We have
7The fact that more quality may harm patients can be precluded as physicians will never invest along
such dimensions. Recall that quality was supposed to be observable.
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dq∗i+1 > dq
∗
i > 0 > dq
∗
i−1 for dli > 0 and dqi+j = 0 for all j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. The relocation’s
impact on quality provision leaves the market share of physician i unchanged. Since the
quality level has increased, i’s proﬁt is reduced.
 

                 	 
 	 
Figure 1: Starting from the perfect symmetric arrangement a relocation of
physician i closer to i+ 1 (dli > 0) alters equilibrium quality provision.
Lemma 1 The perfectly symmetric arrangement of the practices is a Nash equilibrium of
the location subgame.
The proof is presented in the appendix. Assume that asymmetric equilibria do exist.
If the number of entrants in an asymmetric situation equals the number of physicians
in the symmetric case, total quality provision will be higher and some physicians will
incur a loss. Therefore we will have a (weakly) smaller number of practices in asymmetric
equilibria. Since we want to study ineﬃciency in quality due to quality competition and
not due to asymmetry, we limit ourselves to the symmetric case.
In the symmetric equilibrium the optimal quality provision of equation (4) reduces to
(8) q∗i =
np
2ck
, i = 1, ..., n.
In equilibrium the quality increases linearly in the number of entrants and also linearly
in price.8 Quality competition sharpens, the more physicians enter the market and the
8When neglecting non-price competition as, for example, in Economides [1993] and Gravelle
[1999], quality levels are independent of the number of ﬁrms. This seems unreasonable as the number
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better paid the medical treatments get. Regarding the ﬁrst mentioned eﬀect, we see
that this model tends to produce strong ineﬃciencies in total quality. An increase in the
transportation cost parameter c leads to a decrease in equilibrium quality. The reason for
this is that providing a high quality is less eﬀective than before as patients’ responsiveness
to quality is reduced by higher transaction costs. The marginal beneﬁts of quality are
decreasing when c increases (this is like closing the umbrellas in ﬁgure 1 a little). Increases
in k directly drive the costs of quality provision up. All other things equal, the quality
level has to be reduced to equalize marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs.
3.3 Entry
Suppose that the proﬁts earned outside the health care market are zero. Then the number
of entrants is implicitly given by the zero proﬁt condition p
n
− k( np
2ck
)2 = 0. The only real
solution is
(9) n∗ =
(
4c2k
p
) 1
3
.
For simplicity we ignore the fact that n∗ may not be integer valued. With a ﬁrst brief look
at equation (9), the result seems counter intuitive. Why should the equilibrium number of
entrants be lowered by an increase in price? Initially, one would expect the opposite, since
the beneﬁts per patient are increasing. But we have seen in equation (8) that a higher price
increases quality competition among the entrants. This higher intensity in competition
is anticipated at the entry stage. Because of the quadratic quality costs, the higher price
has a deterrent eﬀect.9 The argument for the parameters c and k works in the opposite
direction. Quality competition becomes weaker with an increase in transportation costs or
of ﬁrms is a measure of competition intensity. Consequently, ﬁrst-best eﬃcient quality is in terms of
individual quality levels in Gravelle [1999] where it is in total quality in our paper. Thereby we stress
the substitutability between quality and the number of practices, i.e. access to medical care.
9This reasoning holds, for instance, for cost functions of the form K(q) = kqτ , where k > 0 and
τ > 1. For more complex cost functions the reverse may obtain. If marginal costs of quality provision are
very low, then the costs incurred by the tightened competition are low, making the health care market
more attractive. This also applies when marginal costs increase rapidly as the prohibitive costs prevent
intensive quality competition occurring.
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quality costs making the health market more attractive. The quality cost eﬀect is weaker
since the positive eﬀect is accompanied by a negative cost eﬀect of quality provision.
Before studying welfare we summarize the results of this section.
Proposition 1 The symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium of the sequential 3-stage entry-
location-quality game is given by: q∗i =
pn∗
2ck
= ( p
2
2ck2
)
1
3 , l∗i − l∗i−1 = 1n∗ , for all i = 1, ..., n∗
and n∗ = (4c
2k
p
)
1
3 .
4 The ﬁrst-best optimum
In the presence of convex costs of quality provision and convex transportation costs, the
ﬁrst-best optimum is symmetric, i.e. the quality levels are equal, qi = q for all i = 1, ..., n,
and the practices are arranged symmetrically on the circle. Then the welfare function is
given by
(10) W = q − knq2 − c
12n2
.
The ﬁrst two terms measure the net welfare gain from quality provision. This is reduced
by the expected (or average) transportation costs. When equal welfare weights are consid-
ered, the price does not appear in the welfare function, i.e. p is a welfare neutral transfer
from patients to physicians. Welfare is indirectly, not directly, aﬀected by changes in p.
The ﬁrst-best eﬃcient outcome is obtained by diﬀerentiation with respect to q and n.
Proposition 2 The welfare optimum of the sequential 3-stage entry-location-quality game
is attained iﬀ (1) the number of entrants is nfb = 2ck
3
, and (2) the entrants are arranged
symmetrically, i.e. with distance lfbi − lfbi−1 = 1nfb for all i = 1, ..., nfb, and (3) the quality
provided is qfbi =
1
2nfbk
= 3
4ck2
for all i = 1, ..., nfb. The associated welfare is W fb = 3
16ck2
.
Note that total quality provision is independent of n and c and is equal to 1
2k
. Obvi-
ously, the higher quality costs are, the lower the welfare maximizing level of total quality.
Increasing transportation costs drives the welfare maximizing number of ﬁrms up with-
out changing total quality provision, i.e. physicians’ quality and physician density are
substitutes.
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5 Price regulation and time consistency
In Section 3 we solved the 3-stage game with the ﬂat-rate p seen as exogenous or as the
expected (equilibrium) fee. We now address the regulator’s price setting problem. Her
goal is to set the “welfare maximizing” fee such that the non-cooperative solution stated
in proposition 1 approaches the ﬁrst-best optimum stated in proposition 2.
5.1 Two benchmarks and the ﬁrst-best optimum
Given that the fee inﬂuences the quality decisions of the physicians as well as the number
of entries, we cannot expect to be able to implement the ﬁrst-best optimum by just
setting the welfare maximizing price. We have two regulation goals (the ﬁrst is to ﬁx
the number of ﬁrms to nfb = 2ck
3
and the second is to induce quality choice qfbi =
3
4ck2
for all i = 1, ..., nfb) and only one regulatory variable. To illustrate this, we study two
benchmarks. The ﬁrst benchmark is created by setting a fee such that the total quality
provision is optimal (quality optimal price pq) and the second by setting a fee inducing
optimal entry (entry optimal price pn).
Lemma 2 If the regulation authority chooses the fee pq =
c
n2q
= 1
16ck2
total quality is ﬁxed
to the ﬁrst-best level. The number of entrants is nq = 4ck >
2ck
3
= nfb and thus identiﬁed
as excess capacity. Welfare at pq is Wq =
11
192ck2
≈ 0.057
ck2
.
Individual quality levels are qq =
1
8ck2
and are thus not ﬁrst-best eﬃcient, while total
quality provision is. The quality optimal benchmark diﬀers from the ﬁrst-best solution
only by number of physicians who provide the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient amount of total quality.
Lemma 3 To induce the optimal number of practices, a fee of pn =
27
2ck2
is required.
When faced with this price, physicians provide a quality level of qn =
9
2ck2
> 3
4ck2
= qfb
which is identiﬁed as excess capacity in quality. At this price welfare is Wn = − 14716ck2 .
It is worth noting that we observe excess capacity in both benchmarks. This is because
the quality level varies in price linearly, and the number of entrants varies inversely. Since
pq < pn, it is impossible to implement the ﬁrst-best optimum by just choosing the correct
price.
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5.2 First-best eﬃcient regulation
The above mentioned problem can be solved by applying a second regulatory variable
or by non-constant compensation. Suppose the regulator could compensate on the basis
of any non-constant reimbursement scheme. If marginal compensation increases with
market share, optimal quality provision could be induced. Average compensation could
be set to induce proper entry.10 Let M be the market share of the physician. If, for
instance, individual compensation is based on pind(M) = − 32ck2+ 54kM , the symmetric non-
cooperative equilibrium will be ﬁrst-best eﬃcient (see appendix for a derivation). Licence
fees are somewhat simpler. If the price induces the optimal quality level, the regulator
has to charge an amount of 45
16c2k3
to implement the ﬁrst-best optimum. Introducing lower
bounds for quality (q ≥ qfb), like the minimum standard in Economides [1993], and
controlling entry by a suitable fee (p = 3
8ck2
) will also be ﬁrst-best eﬃcient. Disease
management programs may be seen as such a minimum standard.11
Licence fees can be seen as a tax imposed through demanding (and time consuming)
educational requirements.12 Looking at the increases in physician densities in the 15 EU
member states from 1990 to 1999 (see EUROSTAT [2002, 68]), it would seem that
the eﬀect of the “tax” on entry is limited. Furthermore, as far as we know, neither non-
constant compensation nor explicit licence fees have ever been considered in health care
regulation. One reason may be that the assumption of a benevolent regulator is not always
appropriate. Health care regulation may be viewed as the outcome of a bargaining game
or as the outcome of a rent seeking contest where interest groups strategically interact.
Another reason may be that prestige is a (major) factor in investments in health care.
This especially applies to the ﬁnancing of hospitals and to high-tech medicine.
10We are indebted to Amihai Glazer for pointing this out.
11In Germany the ﬁrst disease management programs started on July 1, 2002. However, there is a
large political debate about whether these guidelines introduce upper or lower bounds on the quality of
care.
12We thank an anonymous referee for providing this interpretation.
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5.3 The second-best optimum
Suppose that the regulator can commit herself to price policies. Welfare is maximized with
respect to the price. Substituting the non-cooperative solutions for q and n of proposition
1, (10) simpliﬁes to
(11) W =
23
24
(
p2
2ck2
) 1
3
− p.
Proposition 3 The second-best optimum of the sequential 3-stage entry-location-quality
game is attained iﬀ the practices are arranged symmetrically and the price is set to psb =(
23
36
)3 1
2ck2
. The resulting equilibrium values are: nsb = 72
23
ck, qsbi =
(
23
36
)2 1
2ck2
for all
i = 1, ..., nsb and W sb =
(
23
36
)3 1
4ck2
≈ 0.065
ck2
.
These values are between the values of the benchmarks given by lemma 2 and lemma
3, implying excess capacity in both entry and total quality provision. The deviation of
these values from those induced by pq is small and consequently welfare is close to Wq as
well.
5.4 Time consistent regulation
When the social planner cannot commit herself to a certain price, the time consistency
issue arises. Whether the second-best outcome can be implemented or not depends on
the credibility of the announcement of p = psb at stage 1 of the game. If the regulator
has an incentive to reoptimize after the entry and location decisions based on psb have
been made, then psb is not credible. Diﬀerentiating (10) with respect to q we observe
preop = c
n2
to be the welfare maximizing fee. Welfare increases from 0.065
ck2
to 0.071
ck2
. But,
with rational physicians, it is impossible to have diﬀerent fees at the diﬀerent stages of the
game. Physicians anticipate the regulator’s incentive to reoptimize between stages two
and three and base their decisions on preop. Since the functional form corresponds to the
quality optimal fee, the decisions are based on pq resulting in welfare
0.057
ck2
as calculated
above. Since W sb > Wq, the regulator would like to bind herself to p
sb. Of course, this
argument, and with it, the time inconsistency result do not rely on the second-best price.
14
Proposition 4 The only credible fee-for-service reimbursement policy of the sequential
3-stage entry-location-quality game is given by the quality optimal price pq. Every price
diﬀerent from pq (including the second-best fee) is not time consistent.
5.5 The median voter equilibrium
In a democracy it may be more appropriate to consider an elected regulator. Suppose
the regulator wants to be re-elected, then the price will be set in favor of the electorate.
If there is majority voting, the median voter decides on p. Assuming that the share of
physicians relative to the share of patients in the population is small, the fee will be
chosen to maximize the patients’ utility function. Utility is obtained by replacing the
quality cost term in the welfare function (10) by p.
Suppose the voters take the eﬀect of changes in p on ﬁrms proﬁts and the equilibrium
number of ﬁrms into account. If they can decide on the number of licences and the fee,
they can implement the ﬁrst-best optimum. The second-best optimum is the outcome if
they can only decide on the fee.
But the sequential structure of the game implies myopic patients. Hence, the voting
behavior described above is not time consistent. Given a certain number of practices,
patients care only about their net gain from quality provision q − p. Diﬀerentiating this
expression with respect to p yields a ﬁrst order condition of n = 2ck. If this equation
holds, the voters have no incentive to change the price after entry and location decisions
have been made. The price corresponding to n = 2ck characterizes the time consistent
voting equilibrium.
Proposition 5 The symmetric time consistent voting equilibrium of the sequential 3-
stage entry-location-quality game is attained iﬀ the price is given by pv = 1
2ck2
. The
resulting equilibrium values are: qvi =
1
2ck2
for all i = 1, ..., nv, nv = 2ck, andW v = − 1
48ck2
.
Excess capacity in both entry and total quality is observed. The price exceeds the
second-best price implying higher quality provision but fewer entrants than in the second-
best equilibrium. Compared to the time consistent regulatory equilibrium, price and
quality are higher and the number of ﬁrms is smaller. Total quality provision doubled
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while costs are 8 times as high. Relative to the costs, the quality of care is poor.13
The welfare derived from the values of proposition 5 is lower than in the time consistent
regulatory case, i.e W v < Wq (see lemma 2). Thus, the commitment problem is more
severe.14
5.6 A numerical example
To illustrate the results of the welfare and time consistency analysis we provide a numerical
example for c = 48 and k = 1
8
(see table below). The ﬁrst-best optimum is attained if
the total quality of 4 quality units is provided by 4 physicians. This can be done by
setting p = 3 and demanding 5
8
as licence fee. In this case, expected welfare is 0.25. The
benchmarks shown in the following two rows show excess entry in the quality optimal
case and excess quality provision in the entry optimal case. In the commitment game
(second-best) we observe excess capacity in terms of both entry and total quality. But
this policy is not time consistent. The regulator’s incentive to reoptimize is shown in the
second last row where a price reduction after the entry decisions have been made (based
on the second-best price) increases welfare from 0.09 to 0.10. The unique time consistent
equilibrium is given by the quality optimal price policy. The commitment problem is
more severe in the median voter equilibrium as indicated by the last row.
6 Price Competition
In the presence of the commitment problem discussed in the previous section, a natural
suggestion would be to allow physicians to also compete in prices. Suppose that at stage
13This is exactly what may be concluded from the World Health Report 2000 for the German health
care system (World Health Organization, WHO [2000, 153]).
14When precluding physician non-price competition as inGravelle [1999], completely diﬀerent results
are obtained, since the voters no longer have the incentive to promote quality competition by increasing
the fee. The voting equilibrium then has lower price, lower quality, and fewer ﬁrms. This changes
implications for the movement of the health care market, especially for the quality of care, when exposing
the health care market to price competition.
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p n q n · q W
ﬁrst-best − 4 1 4 0.25
quality optimal 0.08 24 0.16¯ 4 0.08
entry optimal 18 4 6 24 −12.25
second-best 0.17 18.78 0.27 5.11¯ 0.09
reoptimized 0.14 18.78 0.21 4 0.10
median voter 0.66¯ 12 0.66¯ 8 −0.44¯
Table 1: A numerical example for c = 48 and k = 1
8
.
3 of the game physicians decide simultaneously on quality and prices. Then the critical
patient, i.e. the patient who is indiﬀerent between the practices i and i+ 1, is given by
(12) xcriti =
qi − qi+1
2c(li+1 − li) −
pi − pi+1
2c(li+1 − li) +
li + li+1
2
.
The optimal mix of prices and quality is obtained by diﬀerentiating the proﬁt function
with respect to pi and qi.
Proposition 6 The symmetric equilibrium of the sequential 3-stage entry-location-quality
and price game is given by the quality optimal benchmark, i.e. by the time consistent
regulatory outcome.
The proof is presented in the appendix. Since the competitive outcome coincides
with time consistent regulatory policy, the commitment problem cannot be solved by
introducing price competition into the health care market. This is not very surprising
since both the regulator and the physicians trade oﬀ the beneﬁts of quality provision
against its costs, where price is used to reduce quality competition.
7 Reimbursement of physicians in Germany
In recent decades, we have seen many health care reforms in Germany. But reimbursement
of physicians has always remained on a fee-for-service basis. In 1993 there was a switch
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from cost reimbursement to sectoral budgets in the German health care market. The
(regional) statutory sickness funds15 bargain with the (regional) physicians’ associations
about a (regional) budget for panel doctors. After the budgets are agreed, the physicians’
associations reimburse the physicians on a fee-for-service basis subject to the constraints
given by the ﬁxed budgets. More precisely: a relative value system is applied. Every
service is scored with a certain number of points. The DM value of one point is endoge-
nous. It is determined by dividing the budget by the total number of points submitted
for reimbursement by all physicians. Consequently the budgets in Germany are always
met.16
Our model can be applied to the German reimbursement system. The mass of patients
was assumed to be equal to one. Then, total beneﬁts of the market are p. This is why p
can alternatively be interpreted as a fee-for-service or as a budget for physician services.
The point value in our model is observed very easily. Every patient receives the same
service independent of the physician he visits, and it is not possible for the physicians
to treat a patient more than once. Hence, changes in p directly translate into identical
changes in the point value. If one treatment is scored with one point the point value is p.
From equation (9) we know that the equilibrium number of entrants is a decreasing
function of p. This counter intuitive result was explained by equation (8): the quality
increases linearly in price, and, in the presence of convex costs of quality provision, this
has a deterrent eﬀect. Or, the other way round, a drop in prices makes the health care
market more attractive. The reduced quality competition encourages further entries.
This inverse relationship is observed in Germany (see ﬁgure 2). The point value was
decreasing from 1993 to 1996. The improvement in 1997 is due to the introduction of
clinic budgets in 1997 (see Sachversta¨ndigenrat fu¨r die Konzertierte Aktion
im Gesundheitswesen, SVRKAiG [1998, 369-372]). Since the clinic budgets were
introduced in July 1997, the 1998 value is higher. Without these changes the point value
15In Germany health insurance companies are called sickness funds.
16For a more detailed description of the German physician reimbursement system see Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD [1992, 57-72] and more recent European
Observatory on Health Care Systems, EOHCS [2000, 102-106].
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Figure 2: For the Western La¨nder a reciprocal relationship between the
point value and licenced physicians is observed. Source: Kassena¨rztliche
Bundesvereinigung, KBV [2001, A20] and Bundesministerium fu¨r
Gesundheit, BMG [1999, 260].
would have decreased further.17 In the political debate it is argued that the increasing
number of physicians caused the decline in the point value. This eﬀect is called the
treadmill eﬀect in a ﬁxed budget system. Applying the target income hypothesis, an
expected decrease in the point value implies an increase in the number of (invoiced)
treatments, i.e. supplier induced demand (see Benstetter and Wambach [2001]).
This is very intuitive and is supported by ﬁgure 2. Our model shows that, due to spatial
and quality competition, this relation persists in the absence of supplier induced demand.
Suppose that supplier induced demand is absent from the German health care market.
Furthermore, assume that the point value in Germany is between the benchmarks studied
in section 5 and that the regulator cannot commit herself. Excess capacity in total quality
and entry was identiﬁed in this price range.18 To attain the ﬁrst-best solution price cuts
17We are indebted to Dr. Dahlhausen from the Kassena¨rztliche Bundesvereinigung (KBV) for providing
the pointvalue data. For some of that data see KBV [2000, C6].
18The Sachversta¨ndigenrat fu¨r die Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen, SVRKAiG, reports,
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should be accompanied by a drop in physician licences. Since this is not observed in
Germany, given that our model applies, the regulation of the health care market is not
welfare maximizing. It seems as if the market converges to the time consistent equilibrium
instead of to the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient outcome. Entry regulation is too weak.
One may argue that applying our model to this question is not appropriate since the
point value was decreasing but the size of the budget was not. As a proxy for the budget’s
size we use the expenditure for treatments by panel doctors (see ﬁgure 3). From 1993 to
1999 the expenditure increased by roughly 9 percent in 1991 prices.19 Technical progress
is one of the main drivers of that growth. Making this progress available to the insureds
improves the quality of the medical treatments they receive.20 This can be interpreted as
an increase in voter inﬂuence on health care regulation. The increase in expenditure, i.e.
in price, drives quality up from the time consistent quality level to (or in direction of)
the voting equilibrium value. Our model cannot explain the increase in active physicians
without changing the speciﬁcation of the quality cost function.21 However, approaching
the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient outcome starting from the time consistent outcome, price increases
should be accompanied by a drop in physician licences. We again conclude that licences
are allocated too generously.
8 Conclusion
We presented a model of physician competition in a price regulated environment. In
the absence of price competition physicians resort to other variables to increase proﬁts:
depending on the disease, under-provision and over-provision of health care services in Germany (see
SVRKAiG [2002]). Our model only explains over-provision due to quality competition.
19We deﬂated the numbers for expenditure on treatments found in BMG [1999] and KBV [2001] by
the CPI for all households.
20Alternatively, the expenditure for outpatient care per capita can be used for the same argument. The
increase from 1993 to 1998 is about 11 percent.
21As argued in section 3, if marginal costs of quality provision are low or prohibitive, then the number
of practices increases in the budget. Since the quality provided in Germany is likely to be high, it may
be reasonable to assume prohibitive or at least very high marginal costs.
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Figure 3: Expenditure for outpatient care per capita and for treatments by
licenced physicians, both for the Western La¨nder and both in 1991 prices.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [2001, 129], BMG [1999, 402], and
KBV [2001, G2].
location and quality. The problem was analyzed in a 3-stage entry-location-quality game.
We restricted ourselves to inelastic demand and symmetric equilibria to obtain a lower
benchmark case with respect to the level of quality provision. We found that quality is
an important strategic variable used aggressively to reduce locational handicaps. The
closer two physicians are located, the tighter competition, and, consequently, the higher
the quality provided. An increase in the fee reduces the equilibrium number of entrants.
The higher price sharpens quality competition to an extent that it has a deterrent eﬀect.
The inverse relationship of the point value and the number of licenced physicians observed
in Germany is mainly attributed to the treadmill eﬀect. This may indeed be the more
reasonable explanation, but our model shows that the relation also persists in the absence
of supplier induced demand due to quality competition.
The regulator’s goal is to set a welfare maximizing fee. We studied two prices resulting
in two benchmarks, one in which the number of ﬁrms is ﬁrst-best eﬃcient, and the other
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in which total quality is. Since these two prices do not coincide, the ﬁrst-best optimum
cannot be implemented by just setting the correct fee. If the regulator can commit herself,
she will apply the second-best fee which lies between the benchmark prices. But only the
second of the two benchmarks was identiﬁed as being a credible price policy. Hence, in
the game without commitment, the second-best policy is ruled out as time inconsistent.
The regulator is limited to the quality optimal price. Since expected welfare is lower in
the game without commitment, the regulator would like to bind herself to the second-best
price. The commitment problem cannot be solved either by introducing price competition
into the health care market or by letting voter patients decide on the price. The outcome
of the price competition game corresponds to the time consistent regulatory outcome. In
the voter equilibrium, the commitment problem is more severe.
Theoretically, the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient outcome can be implemented by simultaneously
limiting entry by means of licences. Studying the relation between the price and the
number of physicians makes it possible to judge whether such a policy is being applied.
In both the scenarios discussed in the previous section it was indicated that, although there
is entry regulation in Germany, like need-related planning in the allocation of physician
licences, entry regulation seems too weak.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is split into two steps. First, we show that the symmetric
choice of location is the best physician i can do, if the set of possible locations is restricted
to the open interval
(
l∗i−1, l
∗
i+1
)
. Then, in step two, we show that the locations l∗i−1 and
l∗i+1 lead to negative proﬁts and consequently cannot be equilibrium choices in an entry
game.
(i) Given the symmetric locations of all practices j = i and the set of possible locations(
l∗i−1, l
∗
i+1
)
, the best response of i is to settle in the middle of the neighboring two. To show
this we diﬀerentiate the objective function with respect to li. Substituting the expressions
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following the equations (5) to (7) into the ﬁrst order condition and rearranging yields
8c2k
p2
∂ΠIIi
∂li
=
1(
li − l∗i−1
)3 − 1(
l∗i+1 − li
)3
+
1(
l∗i+1 − li
)2 (
li − l∗i−1
) − 1(
l∗i+1 − li
)2 (
l∗i+2 − l∗i+1
)(13)
+
1(
li − l∗i−1
)2 (
l∗i−1 − l∗i−2
) − 1(
li − l∗i−1
)2 (
l∗i+1 − li
) .
It is easy to see that, in the symmetric solution, the right-hand side of (13) is zero. To
identify this decision as a global maximum on
(
l∗i−1, l
∗
i+1
)
we have to show that i is worse
oﬀ when he deviates from the symmetric location or that he is better oﬀ when he moves
to the center, starting from any asymmetric location. Although (13) is hard to interpret,
the sign is determined for all li ∈
(
l∗i−1, l
∗
i+1
)
. Assume that the practices have symmetric
locations except i which is closer to i− 1 than to i+1, then: l∗i−1− l∗i−2 = l∗i+2− l∗i+1 = 1n ,
l∗i+1 − li > 1n and li − l∗i−1 < 1n . By making a small step to the midpoint, i can increase
proﬁts since the right hand side of (13) is positive. By the same argument, this is true
when i is closer to i+ 1. Notice that, in this case, a movement to the center requires dli
to be negative. Hence, given the symmetric location of the others, i cannot be better oﬀ
when he deviates from the perfect symmetric solution, and he is actually worse oﬀ.
(ii) Consider that the practices are arranged symmetrically and physician i decides
to relocate at exactly the same location as physician i − 1. Since both practices are at
the same location patients will decide for the practice providing the higher quality. Both
practices are competing with the neighboring clinics (i− 2 and i+ 1) in a market of size
3
n
and actually serve a market of size m < 3
n
. Both physicians can only be sure of not
being quality “over-cut” if they provide a quality level which leads to zero proﬁts when
serving m alone. But this quality level cannot be an equilibrium as both physicians will
incur a loss. Thus, no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. 
Derivation of the non-constant price scheme: The average individual compensation is
set such that the physicians exactly break even when providing the ﬁrst-best quality level
in a market with nfb competitors:
(14)
pind(n
fb)
nfb
= k(qfb)2.
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We obtain pind(n
fb) = 3
8ck2
. Using the deﬁnition of the critical patient from equation (2),
the market share of physician i is given by Mi =
n
2c
(2qi − qi+1 − qi−1) + 1n . When the
individual reimbursable price depends on market share, the objective function is given
by Πi = pind(Mi)Mi − kq2i . Assuming symmetry, the ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt
maximizing quality provision is q∗i =
1
2ck
(p′ind + pindn). This equation must hold at n
fb
yielding:
(15)
p′ind(n
fb)
2ck
+
pind(n
fb)
3
= qfb.
Inserting qfb and pind(n
fb) gives the solution for p′: p′ind(n
fb) = 5
4k
. There is an in-
ﬁnite number of reimbursement schemes satisfying the conditions pind(n
fb) = 3
8ck2
and
p′ind(n
fb) = 5
4k
. The easiest is the one mentioned in the text, i.e. p(M) = − 3
2ck2
+ 5
4k
M ,
where M is physician market share. 
Proof of proposition 6: Substituting the expressions for the critical patients into the
proﬁt function yields the objective function for the third stage of the game:
(16) Πi =
pi
2c
[
qi − qi+1
li+1 − li −
pi − pi+1
li+1 − li −
qi−1 − qi
li − li−1 +
pi−1 − pi
li − li−1
]
+
pi
2
(li+1 − li−1)− kq2i .
When solving for the symmetric equilibrium, the ﬁrst order conditions are given by
(17) q =
np
2ck
and p =
c
n2
proving the assertion. 
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